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A SUGGESTED HOMICIDE STATUTE FOR KENTUCKY*
By Roy MORELAND**
In no other state, perhaps, is the law of homicide as unsatis-
factory and confused as in Kentucky. This is largely due to the in-
ertness' of the legislature but the courts have contributed in part
to the present chaotic condition of the law by unsound reasoning
and the use of faulty fictions.
The general situation in this state as to the several offenses
involving homicide may be expressed in a few broad statements.
The crimes of murder and manslaughter are not defined by
statute, although the punishment for willful murder and volun-
tary manslaughter are prescribed.2 This results in the acceptance
of the common law definitions for these offenses.3 Involuntary
manslaughter is a common law misdemeanor punishable under
section 431.075 of the Kentucky Statutes by imprisonment in the
county jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or by a fine
not exceeding $5000, or both.4 A supplemental, anomalous statute
punishes an unintended homicide occurring in the course of strik-
ing, stabbing, or shooting by providing a penalty of confinement
in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than six years.5
Various other supplemental statutes provide for the punishment
of specific acts resulting in homicide.6
The writer has just finished an extended study of the law of
homicide culminating in a book.7 It is the purpose of this paper
o The opinion of the Bar as to the suggestions contained in this article is
invited and letters agreeing or disagreeing with it in whole or in part will be
appreciated.
* A.B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL.B., University of Kentucky College
of Law, 1923; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1928; S.J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1942. Published: A Rationale of Criminal Negligence, 1944; The Law of
Homicide, 1952; contributor to various legal periodicals. Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law, since 1926.
1In the case of Ky. R. S. see. 435.050 (1948) it is due to the ineptness of the
legislature.
'Ky. R. S. sees. 435.010 (1948) and 435.020 (1948).
'Corn. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
'Ky. R. S. see. 431.075 (1950 Supp.).
'Ky. R. S. sec. 435.050 (1948).
'See Ky. R. S. sees. 435.030 (1948), 435.040 (1948), 435.060 (1948), and
435.070 (1948), 1952 Leg. Acts of Ky., c. 51, p. 61.
7 Mona r.., THE LAw OF Hoimcami (1952), published by The Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, price $7.50.
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to turn the findings of that study to account in examining the Ken-
tucky law and in making recommendations for its improvement.
To that end, it is planned to restate the common law in summary
form as to the various categories of homicide, to examine the
statutory regulation of the crime in the various states and, finally,
to make specific suggestions for statutory reform in this juris-
diction.
I. MURDER
Perhaps the most sound and practical categorization of the
common law as to murder is the one promulgated by Judge
Stephen in 1883 in his History of the Criminal Law of England.8
Certainly it is the one most frequently mentioned in legal writings
and in decisions.9 Stephen in dealing with the subject of malice
aforethought as used in murder at common law places the state of
mind requisite for murder in four categories:
"Malice aforethought means any one or more of the fol-
lowing states of mind preceding or co-existing with the act
or omission by which death is caused, and it may exist
where that act is unpremeditated:
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily
harm to, some person, whether such person is the per-
son actually killed or not.
(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will prob-
ably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to,
some person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied
by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm
is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on
his way to or returning from the execution of the duty
of arresting, keeping in custody, or imprisoning any
person whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in
custody, or imprison, or the duty of keeping the peace,
or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the
offender has notice that the person killed is such an
officer so employed."' 0
'8 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE Cru wNAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 80-81 (1883).
'For a Kentucky citation of judge Stephens' analysis of murder, see Turner v.
Com., 167 Ky. 365, 369, 180 S.W. 768, 770 (1915).
"3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CnmINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 80-81 (1883).
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These four categories furnish the most feasible framework, it
is believed, for an examination of the law of murder, both at com-
mon law and under modern statutes. Each category will now be
discussed in turn.
(a) Intentional Murder.
"An intention to cause the death of, or grievious bodily harm
to, some person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not."
This category embodies what is commonly called the intended
murder at common law. It includes not only those homicides
which the killer actually "willed" and hoped for, but also those
where his conduct was such that death or grievous bodily harm
was "substantially certain" to follow from his act.' This is be-
cause if one does an act of such extremely high probability for a
tragic result, he will not be heard to say he did not intend it. Or
perhaps the law considers that he is lying when he says he did not
intend the result.
It is to be noted that the rule also covers a situation where the
actor did not intend to kill but only to do grievous bodily harm.
Such a situation is undoubtedly something short of actual in-
tention to kill but closely akin to the negligent murder to be dis-
cussed in category (b), infra, where conduct "wantonly disregard-
ful of the lives and safety of others,' '1 2 resulting in the death of
a human being, is punished as murder at common law. In such a
case the actor is guilty if the degree of negligence is sufficiently
high, an intent to kill or to do harm not being required. It may
well be argued that a homicide arising out of an intent to do
grievous bodily harm only should also be in category (b) but it
was in the intended murder category at common law and remains
there today in the absence of a statute.13
The common law brought another situation within the orbit
of the "intended" murder, although an actual intent to kill the
deceased was not present. This occurred in the case of so-called
"transferred" intent. Thus, if A intending to kill B missed him
"Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HAnv. L. Rmv. 905, 910-911 (1939).
MorELAN, TBE LA-w oF HOMICmE 33 (1952).
See Professor Perkins' discussion of this type of "intended" murder, Perkins,
A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 552-555 (1934). See
RoBERSoN, NEv KEuCKy Cnm NAtrL LAW AND PROCEDURE sec. 350 and cases
cited in fn. 5 (2nd. ed. 1927).
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and killed C, who might be his best friend, the law "transferred"
A's intent to kill B to C and held A guilty of intended murder. 14
Proof of Intent
"Intention" is a state of mind which, of necessity, is known
only to the accused. If the defendant pleads guilty, this subjective
fact is made known; if he does not plead guilty, it devolves on the
jury to determine whether the killing was an intentional one. It
sometimes happens that the one who intentionally kills utters
language at the time of the attack which clearly indicates his in-
tent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm. When, however, he
does not indicate his purpose by words it may be possible for
the jury to infer it from his conduct at the time of the killing.',
The common law raised an inference of intent based upon con-
duct in at least two instances. Very early in the law it became the
rule that once it was proved that the defendant committed a
killing it was inferred that he did it with express malice (in-
tentionally), thus putting the burden on him of proving circum-
stances of alleviation, excuse or justification. However, the House
of Lords repudiated the rule in a recent English decision,1 it
has been repeatedly criticised,1' and it is believed and hoped that
Kentucky would not apply it at the present time if the question
were properly presented. 8 It is a dangerous inference at the best
for it may not be true in the particular case. Moreover, it inter-
feres with the prosecution's duty to prove the defendant guilty and
the jury's function to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The common law raised a second inference of intent from con-
duct in the case where the killing occurred from the use of a
deadly weapon. This was because a deadly weapon used in a
deadly manner is so likely to produce death or serious bodily
harm that it was thought not to be too harsh to raise an inference
14 ". . . if A. by malice aforethought strikes at B. and missing him strikes C.
whereof he dies, tho he never bore any malice to C. yet it is murder, and the law
transfers the malice to the party slain." 1 HALE, PLEAs OF TE CROWN (ed. of
1778) 466. Shelton v. Com., 145 Ky. 548, 140 S.W. 670 (1911); Wheatley v.
Com., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 436, 81 S.W. 687 (1904). See Note, 84 Ky. L. J. 224
(1946); Note, 35 Ky. L. J. 78 (1946). A number of Kentucky cases are cited in
these notes.
See the discussion, Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
YALE L. J. 537, 549 (1934).
" Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, A. C. 462 (1935).
, See, for example, MAY, CRanmAL LAW sec. 165 (4th ed. 1938).
" See the discussion, MorEA.ND, TEE LAw OF HowscmE 21 et seq. (1952).
See also the critical and excellent note by Selby Hurst, Note, 34 Ky. L. J. 306
(1946).
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of an intent to kill from its use. The doctrine has been subject to
occasional sharp criticism 19 but it remains firmly entrenched in
the law.
20
What changes have been made by the Kentucky legislature in
the common law of intended murder? The only Kentucky statute
is one which punishes "willful" murder by confinement in the
penitentiary for life, or by death. 21 The courts look to the com-
mon law for the definition of "willful" murder.22 There are no
degrees of murder in Kentucky.
Similarly, there are no degrees of murder at common law and
in England all murder is punished by death to this day.2 3 How-
ever, most jurisdictions divide the crime into degrees by statute
today. The primary purpose in doing this has been to relieve the
harshness of the situation at common law and in England by limit-
ing the use of the death penalty. The division of the crime into
degrees with the death penalty reserved for the first degree only
accomplishes this purpose, it is believed.
Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt this expedient of
mitigating the rigor of the common law by dividing murder into
degrees and the most common definitions of both first and second
degree murder are still the ones derived from this pioneer Penn-
sylvania Act of 1794.24
The definition of first degree murder under the Pennsylvania
Act included (a) "wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing,"
and (b) homicide occurring in the commission of certain named
felonies. The most common modern statutory definition of second
degree murder, also derived from the Pennsylvania Act is, in sub-
stance, "all other homicides which would have been murder at
common law."25
It will be noted that the Pennsylvania Act introduces the word
"premeditated" into the definition of "intended" murder in de-
" See for example, REPORT OF LAW REv. Co,. OF N. Y. 539, especially n. 36
(1936).
' See Note, 34 Ky. L. J. 320 (1946). A number of Kentucky cases are cited
in this note.
-"Ky. R. S. sec. 435.010 (1948).
"Com. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
" "However, the Home Secretary has the power, and in a substantial number
of cases uses it, to commute a death sentence for murder to life imprisonment or
even less." HALL Am GLuEcir, CASES ON CiamwAL LAW, 114 (1940).
1 Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL. L. REv.
701, 704-705 (1937); REP. OF LAw REv. CoM. oF N. Y. 543 (1937).
1 Wechsler and Michael, supra note 24, at 705.
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fining murder in the first degree. Intended murder which is not
premeditated is murder in the second degree under the Pennsyl-
vania Act and under most modern statutes.
Is the use of the word "premeditated" to divide intended
murder into degrees a wise policy? It is believed that it is. This
conclusion is determined largely by the belief that while all in-
tended murder is heinous it should not all be capitally punished.2 6
The deliberate, coldblooded, planned murder is more heinous
than one which, while intended, is committed without pre-
meditation under the stress and strife of the immediate circum-
stances which precipitated the killing.
The Kentucky statute changes the common law in that it
provides a choice of imprisonment for life or death as the punish-
ment for intended murder. However, contra to the statutory situa-
tion in most states, the discretion is wholly in the jury as to which
punishment will prevail. It is believed that it would be better
to follow the general rule and divide intended murder into two de-
grees, the degree depending upon whether the intended homicide
was committed with or without premeditation.
It is further recommended that the statute define the word
"premeditation." Experience in other states has shown that the
courts have done much to water down or defeat the legislative
purpose by their interpretation of the meaning of "premedita-
tion." While the word means "meditation ahead of time," it does
not indicate how much ahead of time. The courts quite naturally
gradually narrow the period of time required for the act to be
premeditated until it is finally said that the requisite period can
be satisfied in a few seconds.27 To prevent this judicial defeat of
the intent of the legislature it is recommended that the legislature
fix the meaning of the word by defining it.28
The following intended murder statute, which embodies the
suggestions above, is recommended:
"See.... Murder in the first degree defined. The killing
of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is
murder in the first degree, when committed:
' Indeed, the death penalty has been abolished in all cases in Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin. Id. at 703, fn. 11.
See the searching criticism of Justice Cardozo, CAnozo, LAw, LrrRu
AND OTmm ADDREsSES 97-99 (1931).
See the discussion, MoRELAND, THE LAw OF HoMIcrDE 207 (1952).
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From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed, or of another. The word 'de-
liberate" as used in this statute means formed, arrived at,
or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of consequences. The word 'premeditated' means
thought on, and revolved in the mind beforehand; contrived
and designed previously.29
Sec .... Murder in the second degree defined. Such
killing of a human being is murder in the second degree,
when committed with a design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another, but without deliberation and
premeditation."
(b) The Negligent Murder.
Stephen's second category of murder at common law is worded
as follows:
"Knowledge that the act which causes death will prob-
ably cause the death of, or griveous bodily harm to, some
person, whether such person is the person actually killed or
not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indiffer-
ence whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or
not, or by a wish that it may not be caused."
This category embraces the common law negligent murder.
The early English cases and classic common law treatises enumer-
ate a serious of extremely dangerous acts, the doing of which is
said to evince a "depraved heart regardless of human life" and
to warrant a conviction of murder if a death results from such
conduct. Early writers differ as to the basis of liability in such
cases but they are generally considered to come within the general
concept of negligence and to be distinguished from the negligence
required for manslaughter by the relatively higher degree of
danger involved in the act. Various phrases have been used to
describe this higher degree of negligence required for the negli-
gent murder but there seems to be an increasing tendency to de-
scribe it as "conduct wantonly disregardful of the lives and safety
of others."'80 The key word is wantonness whether the-noun, ad-
verb, or adjective is used.
'WEBsEX, Nmv INmENATIONAL DrcnoNRaY (2nd ed. 1944). See the ex-
cellent article, Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of
Murder, 97 UNIv. PA. L. REv. 759 (1949), noting especially 771 fn. 96. See also,
REP. OF LAw REv. Com. oF N. Y. 561, et seq., especially at 564.
See MoaELAND, A RATONALE OF C~nm;AL NEGLIGENcE 63-65 (1944). See
Tincher, Proposed Statutory Reform in the Law of Negligent Homicide in Ken-
tucky, 30 Ky. L. J. 841, 356 at fn. 84 (1942).
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Most of the states have statutes incorporating the negligent
murder. Under some of these statutes the crime is murder in the
first degree;-3 in most states the offense is murder in the second
degree. Various phrases are used in these statutes to describe the
kind of conduct requisite for the negligent murder but almost all
of them are attempted codifications of the common law. They are
therefore subject to the criticisms commonly leveled at the com-
mon law definitions of the offense. The phrases used do not
describe either the crime or the act with sufficient certainty. They
are picturesque but not satisfying; all are ambiguous.
In an attempt to incorporate the principles of the common law
in describing the very high degree of dangerous conduct requisite
for the negligent murder and yet use phraseology which is reason-
ably clear and certain of interpretation, the following statute is
submitted:
"The un-intentional killing of a human being, unless it is
excusable or justifiable, is murder in the second degree,
when committed: ...
By an act so extremely dangerous and disregardful of the
lives and safety of others as to be wantonly disregardful of
such interests according to the standard of the conduct of a
reasonable man under the circumstances."
In this statute the phrase "so extremely dangerous.., as to be
wantonly disregardful . . ." has been substituted for the pic-
turesque but ambiguous phrases commonly used to describe the
depraved conduct required for liability as negligent murder. The
standard of conduct chosen is an objective one, that of the "reason-
able man," which is the standard of conduct in criminal negli-
gence on the manslaughter level.32 The statute punishes the
offense as murder in the second degree, the rule in most juris-
dictions.
Now what is the situation in Kentucky as to the negligent
murder? There is no Kentucky statute specifically embodying the
offense and there is confusion in the cases as to whether it survived
as a common law crime in this state. There is one line of cases
'For example, it is murder in the first degree in New York. N. Y. CONSOL.
LAws, PENAL LAW, sec. 1044 (Thompson, 1939).
' As to a choice between the subjective and objective standards of care for
criminal negligence on the murder level, see the discussion, MORELAND, THE LAw
OF HoMCn 36 (1952).
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holding that it did not. Ewing v. Commonwealth,3 3 representative
of this series, states that while at common law malice would be
implied from a shooting arising out of the reckless use of a fire-
arm, the doctrine of implied malice is rejected in Kentucky. The
court went on to say:
"When we reject the doctrine of implied malice, the issue
of malice is a question for the jury, and the offense which
would otherwise be murder becomes voluntary manslaugh-
ter, where under the evidence the jury find as a fact that the
killing was not done with malice aforethought. Accordingly
it has been held in Kentucky in a long line of cases that,
where one kills another by the wanton, reckless, or grossly
careless use of firearms, the offense, if without malice afore-
thought, is voluntary manslaughter, although he had no in-
tention."
3 4
Thus, this line of cases apparently led to the introduction in
this state of the preposterous doctrine of negligent voluntary man-
slaughter,35 accepted in no other jurisdiction, and criticised in
some detail later in this article.
Another line of cases holds that the common law negligent
murder did survive in this state. The leading case shpporting this
view is Brown v. Commonwealth,36 where the accused fired a
pistol in a crowded room killing one of the occupants. The court
affirmed a conviction of murder saying:
"If he did this not with the intention of killing anyone,
but for his diversion merely, but killed one of the crowd,
he is guilty of murder; for such conduct establishes 'general
malignity and recklessness of the lives and safety of others,
which proceed from a heart void of just'sense of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief.'"ar
129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W. 352 (1908). Other Kentucky cases in accord are
cited in this decision.
-Id. at 241, S.W. at 854.
' The rule that the wantonly negligent use of firearms resulting in death is
voluntary negligent manslaughter is again enunciated in the later case of Lucas
v. Com., 231 Ky. 76, 21 S.W. 2d 113 (1929) where the court said:
"We are concerned in this case with manslaughter as a result of feloni-
ous negligence, for it is apparent the accused was found guilty under
the instructions covering it. In many cases this court has declared that,
where one kills another by the wanton, reckless, or grossly careless use
of firearms, the offense is voluntary manslaughter, although he had no
intention to kill."
See also, Davis v. Com., 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W. 24 (1922).
13 Ky. L. R. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (1891).
'7 Id. at 378, S.W. at 221.
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This is an acceptance of the common law negligent murder;3
even the wording of the opinion is couched in the picturesque
phraseology of old writers in their discussions of that crime.
The net result of these two lines of decisions is that there is
case authority in this state for three different crimes involving
homicide arising out of criminal negligence,-murder, voluntary
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Gregory39 and
Roberson" both cite cases supporting all three crimes in their
texts on Kentucky criminal law. This has, of course, resulted in a
great deal of confusion.
What should be done about it? In the first place, the crime of
negligent voluntary manslaughter should be repudiated and
weeded out of Kentucky law. There can be no such thing as a
negligent voluntary manslaughter,-the very name is a contradic-
tion in terms.
The problem has been somewhat clarified, although by no
means solved, by the passage of a statute by the 1950 legislature.
This statute41 limits the punishment for all common law crimes,
the punishment for which is not provided by statute, to a maxi-
mum imprisonment of one year. This statute eliminates the possi-
bility of punishing the common law negligent murder in this state
at the present time, since the punishment of involuntary man-
slaughter, a lesser crime, is greater than provided for by this
statute. Unfortunately, the crime of negligent voluntary man-
slaughter continues under this statute.
The legislature should adopt a statutory program that would
provide for the punishment of criminal negligence on all levels
and eliminate the voluntary negligent manslaughter. If this were
done, it would be unnecessary to repeal Kentucky Revised
Statutes, section 431.075 (1950), since this statute is applicable
only to common law offenses.
See also, Hill v. Corn., 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W. 2d 261 (1931); Guinn v. Com.,
11 Ky. L. R. 615, 12 S.W. 672 (1889); Colliher v. Corn., 2 Duval 163 (Ky.
1865). See GRECORY, KENTucKY CiRiuNAL LAW, PnoCnInE AND ForRMs sec. 70
(1918); ROBERSON, NEW KENTUCKY CRnNMAL LAW AND PRoCEDmuE sees. 358-862
(2nd. ed. 1927).
'GrEGORY, KENTUCKY CRnmNA.L LAW, Procmnun AND Forms see. 70
(1918).
oROBEnSON, NEw KENTUCY CmRIAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE sees. 858-362
(2d. ed. 1927).
" Ky. R. S. see. 481.075 (1950).
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In drafting such a complete program for the statutory punish-
ment of homicides arising out of criminal negligence the first
problem to be considered would be whether it is wise to have a
crime of negligent homicide with a punishment of greater severity
than involuntary manslaughter. Most states have considered it
wise and so have the crime of negligent murder, either by statute
or under the common law. Kentucky seems to sense such a need
in her adoption of the illogical and technically impossible negli-
gent voluntary manslaughter.
It is therefore considered that it would be best to incorporate
the negligent murder in the new statute. The definition of the
offense in the suggested statute on page 146, supra, is recom-
mended. The maximum punishment for the crime should not
be greater than life, it is believed, although the offense is statutory
murder in the first degree in a number of jurisdictions.
(c) The Felony Murder
The third category in Stephen's analysis of common law
murder embodies the felony murder doctrine.42 The common
law rule was that if a death occurred in the commission of an un-
lawful act it was murder or manslaughter depending upon
whether the unlawful act out of which the killing arose was a
felony or a misdemeanor. This was extremely harsh, particularly
as to the felony murder. Judge Stephen leveled a number of
vitriolic attacks at the felony murder rule and wrote an opinion in
a case which did much to soften its impact. This case, Regina v.
Serne,43 held that if a homicide occurred in the commission of a
felony, it would not be murder, unless the felony in itself was one
dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death.
It will be immediately perceived that stating the rule in this
manner, it becomes parallel with the rule of negligence in the case
of the negligent murder.44 The cases show an increasing tendency
to make the two rules parallel stating that it is not the fact that
the accused was committing a felony when the homicide occurred
that makes him liable but it is because his act was one so ex-
tremely dangerous as to make it wantonly disregardful of the lives
"See Stephen's analysis, supra, p. 140.
" 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
"MonELAND, Tim LAw OF HOMICIDE 44 (1952).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of others.45 This conception of the felony murder doctrine is com-
monly incorporated in modern statutes which make one who kills
while committing a felony guilty under the felony murder rule
only when the felony is arson, rape, robbery or burglary,-all
felonies ordinarily extremely dangerous in themselves to human
life and safety.46 It only remains to put the affirmative burden on
the prosecution to show extreme danger in the act of the accused
which caused death in each and every case and some cases have
taken this ultimately correct position.
47
There is no statute embodying the felony murder in Kentucky
but it survived as a common law crime in this state. In Common-
wealth v. Reddick,48 the first reported case in the state dealing
directly with a homicide in the commission of a felony, the ac-
cused burglarized and burned a hotel, where he knew people
were living, causing the deaths of three persons. The court
pointed out the natural danger in his acts and held that he was
guilty of murder although he may not have intended the killings.
The question of proximate cause was not presented on the appeal
although the facts would undoubtedly support a finding of proxi-
mate cause.
Two later decisions, Williams v. Commonwealth49 and Marion
v. Commonwealth,50 subscribe to the felony murder doctrine but
neither of the opinions is clear as to the requisite degree of
danger in the felony out of which the homicide arose.5 ' In these
cases the homicides allegedly arose out of robbery, a felony ex-
' People v. Goldvarg, 346 M. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931) (arson); Williams v.
Com., 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W. 2d 891 (1935) (robbery); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich.
562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924) (selling liquor, statutory felony) (defendant was not
convicted).
" These are the four felonies incorporated in the statutes of thirteen states.
For example see, ALA. CODE, tit. 14, see. 314 (1940); 10 OHio Gm. CODE ANN.
sec. 12400 (Page 1939).
' See the cases cited in fn. 45, supra.
Existing statutes are still too harsh. The four felonies ordinarily named in
them are not necessarily, under all circumstances, extremely dangerous. For ex-
ample, robbery is potentially dangerous to human life and safety and yet it may
have been accomplished in a fairly non-dangerous way in the particular case. The
robber may not have been armed and he may have been robbing a man of twice
his weight and fighting ability.
As a further illustration, see the discussion of People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. 802,
111 Pac. 2d 679 (1941) in Hurst, The Felony Murder Docrine Repudiated, Note,
36 Ky. L. J. 106 (1947).
17 Ky. L. R. 1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895).
"258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W. 2d 891 (1935).
"269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W. 2d 721 (1937).
See Note, 29 Ky. L. J. 130, 131 (1940).
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tremely dangerous under most circumstances. In the Williams
case the court stated that robbery is a crime "which tends to the
injury of another." This is a weak statement if the court intends
to follow that line of cases which holds that the felony must be
"extremely dangerous in itself." Nothing is said in the opinion
about proximate cause.
The Marion case simply states that a homicide committed
while in the commission of "any other felony" is murder. It may
well be argued that the court applied in this decision the historic
rule that a homicide arising out of the commission of any felony,
regardless of the danger involved, is murder.
In Whitfield v. Commonwealth,52 the fourth case in the Ken-
tucky series, the defendant was indicted jointly with two others
for the crime of willful murder by setting fire to a house and burn-
ing a child to death. The evidence showed that the defendant was
not near enough to aid and abet in the crime. A conviction was
accordingly obtained under an instruction on conspiracy. The
defendant contended, inter alia, that the court erred in not sub-
mitting to the jury the question of whether the killing of the child
was the natural consequence of the burning of the house and
therefore within the purpose of the conspiracy. The appellate
court affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no doubt
that the death of the child was the natural result of burning the
house and that therefore it was not necessary for the conspiracy
instruction to submit this question for the determination of the
jury. This case, it is submitted, is of no value in determining
whether the Kentucky courts require a felony extremely danger-
ous in itself to sustain a conviction of murder under the felony
murder doctrine because the conviction was based upon con-
spiracy and that technical fact made it necessary for the court to
determine that the homicide was the natural result of the con-
spiracy in order to sustain the conviction.5 3
The last case in the felony murder series in Kentucky is Simp-
son v. Commonwealth,54 decided in 1943. This decision, at least
so far as language would indicate, follows the historic rule that a
- 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W. 2d 208 (1939).
" Note, 29 Ky. L. J. 130 (1940). Contra, Note, 29 Ky. L. J. 128 (1940).
'293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W. 2d 869 (1943).
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homicide occurring in the commission of any felony is murder.
Another writer has given the case this same interpretation.55
It may be concluded that the Kentucky cases dealing with the
felony murder are confused and uncertain. There is doubt
whether the more modern and more acceptable rule that the
felony in itself must involve an act extremely dangerous to life
and safety is the rule or whether the court has continued to apply
the historic doctrine that a homicide occurring in the commission
of any felony is murder. It is impossible to determine whether the
Kentucky court would require that the felony be the proximate
cause of the homicide, some courts do not.56
With the situation in this condition, the Legislature in 1950
passed the statute,57 mentioned in the discussion of the negligent
murder,58 which limits the punishment for all common law crimes,
the punishment for which is not provided by statute, to a maxi-
mum of one year. This statute, as in the case of the negligent
murder, eliminates the felony murder in this state, for all practical
purposes, since the punishment for involuntary manslaughter, a
lesser crime, is greater than provided for by this statute.
The question now arises, What should be the program for the
future as to the felony murder in this state? It is suggested that no
statutory action at all be taken as to this offense. The crime is
practically out of the working law of the state at the present time
because of section 431.075 of the Kentucky Statutes, and it is
deemed unwise to resurrect the offense. The adoption of the
negligent murder statute recommended, supra,0 would afford a
means for the prosecution of any homicide arising in the com-
mission of any felony where the felony was one extremely danger-
ous to human life and safety under the circumstances of the case
and it was the proximate case of the homicide.10 This would fill
the gap left by the elimination of the felony murder"' and reach
a result in accordance with modern trends.
' Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 106 (1947).
'See People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. 802, 111 P. 2d 679 (1941) and Note, 36 Ky.
L. J. 106, 108 (1947).
'Ky. R. S. sec. 431.075 (1950).
See the discussion, p. 148, supra.
See page 146, supra.
® See the discussion, Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 106 et seq. (1947).
If a specific felony murder statute were desired, it might be incorporated
in the negligent murder statute as follows:
"Sec .......... Murder in the second degree defined. The killing of a human
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(d) Homicide in Resisting Arrest
The fourth category in Stephen's analysis of murder incorpo-
rates the common law rule that killing an officer while resisting a
lawful arrest is murder.
62
The rule, however, is considered by modern writers to be un-
sound and hazardous. 63 Resistance to lawful arrest was only a mis-
demeanor at common law and is generally placed in the same
category in modern penal codes, so the offense, at most, should be
no more than manslaughter. And to take one further step, since
the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine has broken down, except
where the misdemeanor is dangerous in itself,64 the rule under
discussion is superfluous today. Such situations fit logically into
the negligence category, on either the manslaughter or murder
level, depending upon the degree of danger created by the re-
sistance to the arrest.
But, while the rule is generally repudiated, it survived as a
common law crime in this state. Dilger v. Commonwealth65 is
often cited by subsequent cases as establishing the rule in Ken-
tucky. In that case the defendant in resisting lawful arrest killed
the officer with a "deadly bowie knife." The court in affirming
the murder conviction said:
"The law did not require that they should have been told
that the killing must have been malicious. The officer is
the minister of the law. He represents its majesty. His per-
son is therefore clothed with a peculiar sanctity. An assault
being, unless it is justifiable or excusable, is murder in the second degree, when
committed:
"b. Unintentionally, by an act so extremely dangerous and disregardful of
the lives and safety of others as to be wantonly disregardful of such interests
according to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man under the cir-
stances.
(1) The unintentional killing of a human being perpetrated in commit-
ting arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed homicide by an act con-
stituting wantonly dangerous conduct as defined in this section, provided the
arson, robbery, burglary or rape was extremely dangerous in itself under the
circumstances and the homicide was the proximate result of its commission."
For a discussion of statutory regulation of the felony murder in the various
states, see Monva AND, Tim LAw oF HoMiCm 217 (1952). See also, Perkins, A
Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, especially at 566-570
(1934).
S ee Stephen's analysis, supra, page 140.
'See the discussion, MonRLAND, Tim LAW OF HOMICIDE 226 (1952).
"See the discussion, infra, pp. 166-168. The modem rule in the case of both
the felony murder and the misdemeanor manslaughter is that the crime out of
which the homicide arose must be dangerous in itself. This makes the offenses
parallel with the negligent murder and the negligent manslaughter respectively.U88 Ky. 550, 11 S.W. 651 (1889).
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upon him, when properly engaged in the execution of his
duty, is an assault upon the law; and if he be stricken down
at such a time... by one knowing him to be an officer, it is
murder, although the doer may not have any particular
malice."
66
This decision illustrates a point common to these cases. While
the conviction of murder was based upon the rule under discus-
sion, it might better have been grounded on the reasoning that
since the accused attacked the deceased with a deadly bowie knife,
it might have been inferred from his use of a deadly weapon that
he killed him with express malice. An article in the Cornell Law
Quarterly states that all such cases could have been decided on
other and sounder grounds.
67
At any rate, as in the case of the common law negligent murder
and common law felony murder, the crime has ceased to have
practical value in this state because of the passage by the legisla-
ture in 1950 of the act limiting the punishment for all common
law crimes, the punishment for which is not provided by statute,
to a maximum imprisonment of one year.6 8 This statute causes
the crime to have no present vitality. It is accordingly recom-
mended, that no statutory action be taken as to the offense. As in
the case of the felony murder, the crime is out of the working law
of the state because of section 431.075 of the Kentucky Statutes,69
and it should not be resurrected. The adoption of the recom-
mended negligent murder statute70 would make it possible to
punish the slayer in such cases where he has acted in wanton dis-
Id. at 561, S.W. at 653.
The last Kentucky case applying the common law rule that a homicide in
resisting an officer or other person in performing his official duty is murder was
Elliott v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 502, 161 S.W. 2d 633 (1942). Elliott killed a
county jailer in attempting an escape from jail. The appellate court in affirming a
conviction of murder, said: "Where an officer is killed in the discharge of his
duty 'it is not necessary to constitute the crime of murder that the slayer should
have had any particular malice,' provided, of course, that the slaying was not done
by the accused in defending himself from an act of the officer in excess of his
powers and authority as such." Id. at 505, S.W. at 635. See also Cornett v. Com.,
198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 540 (1923); Donehy v. Com., 170 Ky. 474, 186 S.W. 161
(1916); Fleetwood v. Com., 80 Ky. 1 (1882). See ROBERSON, NE.W KENTucKy
CamnrAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, sec. 365 (2d. ed. 1927); GREGORY, KENTUCKY
C uNMnAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND FoRms sec. 76 (1918).
' The author of the article states that he has not found a single case where the
decision might not have been put on another ground. Dickey, Culpable Homicide
in Resisting Arrest, 18 CoRN. L. Q. 373, 376 (1933).
'Ky. R. S. sec. 431.075 (1950 Supp.).
00 Ibid.
0o See page 146, supra.
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regard of the officer's life and safety.71 If his negligence were less
than wanton but of a sufficiently high degree to constitute reckless
conduct under the circumstances, he could be punished under
the recommended negligent involuntary manslaughter statute
72
to be discussed later in this paper. If his conduct is neither wanton
nor reckless, he should not be guilty of any criminal homicide.
II. INTENTIONAL (VOLUNTARY) MANSLAUGHTER
Before discussing the Kentucky cases relating to intentional
or voluntary manslaughter, it will be helpful to restate briefly the
situation at common law. Voluntary manslaughter at common
law is an unlawful homicide resulting from an intention to kill or
to do grievous bodily harm to another which would be murder
except for some sort of extenuating circumstance.73 The primary
problem, then, in a discussion of voluntary manslaughter is to
determine what circumstances the law recognizes as sufficiently
extenuating to cause an intentional killing to be voluntary man-
slaughter rather than intentional murder. The law has long
recognized four situations which raise sufficient "heat of passion"
in a reasonable man to justify letting them serve as mitigating cir-
cumstances. Those four situations are, (1) sudden, mutual com-
bat,74 (2) the sight of adultery of one's wife, 75 (3) an assault and
battery upon one's person,
76 and (4) an illegal arrest.
77
There are Kentucky decisions to the effect that sudden, mutual
combat,78 the sight of adultery of one's wife, 79 and an assault and
battery upon one's person80 constitute sufficient "provocation" to
reduce what would otherwise be an intentional murder to volun-
Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HAnv. L. R. 905, 917 (1939).
" See the recommended statute at page 166, infra. For the general discussion
of unintentional homicide arising out of an unlawful act on the manslaughter level,
see pp. 166-168, infra.
" For a detailed study of intentional (voluntary) manslaughter at common
law, see the discussion, MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICiDE, pp. 64-98 (1952).
' See the discussion, id. at pp. 69-78.
See the discussion, id. at pp. 82-86.
" See the discussion, id. at pp. 73-77.
' See the discussion, id. at pp. 77-82.
"Hanna v. Com., 242 Ky. 584, 46 S.W. 2d 1098 (1932). ROBERSON, Nzv
KEvcUKy CnmurNAr LAw AND Pnoci tnrE sec. 383 (2d ed. 1927); GREcORY, KEN-
TUcCY CmaNmAL LAw, PRocEDRE AND FoRms sec. 86 (1918).
"Harris v. Com., 236 Ky. 666, 33 S.W. 2d 666 (1930) (dictum). Roberson,
op. cit. supra, note 78, sec. 389.
" Williams v. Com., 80 Ky. 313 (1882). Roberson, op. cit. supra, note 78,
sec. 884.
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tary manslaughter. Whether an illegal arrest by an officer will
serve as provocation in this state is doubtful s It is believed that
the common law and majority rule that it may is the better one.
While one should not kill to prevent an illegal arrest, nothing
raises greater heat of passion in the breast of a liberty-loving per-
son, and the law does well to compromise with one whose emotions
are so sorely pressed as to hold him guilty of voluntary manslaugh-
ter rather than murder, if he does kill the offender of his person,8
2
because of heat of passion engendered by the unlawful arrest.
It is commonly said that cases of intentional killing are "re-
duced" to voluntary manslaughter, if at all, by provocation.
8 3
However, as several writers have pointed out,8 4 there are a number
of cases holding that there are a few situations where a defendant
may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter on the ground of an
extenuating circumstance other than provocation. In other
words, the provocation category is too narrow to encompass all of
the cases of voluntary manslaughter. Among the extenuating
circumstances, other than provocation, which may cause an in-
tentional homicide to become voluntary manslaughter are, (1)
situations involving an "imperfect" defense of person or habita-
tion, and (2) the "partial" insanity of the accused.8 5
(1) Situations of "imperfect" defense of self or habitation.
Situations of "imperfect defense of self or habitation" occur
where the defendant would be entitled to plead self-defense or de-
fense of habitation under the facts of the case if he had not been at
fault in starting the difficulty which resulted in the homicide. If he
were permitted to plead self-defense or defense of habitation he
would be excused and he would be guilty of no crime; since he
started the controversy he is denied the right to do so but the law
instead of holding him guilty of murder because of the intentional
s'Alsop v. Com., 4 Ky. L. R. 547, 11 Ky. op. 851 (1882) held that the il-
legality of the arrest would not serve as a provocation to reduce the offense to
voluntary manslaughter. See Dickey, Culpable Homicide in Resisting Arrest, 18
ConN. L. Q. 373, 386, fn. 40 (1933). But see, Wright v. Com., 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W.
904 (1887) (illegal arrest by private person).
' See the discussion, MouELAim, Tnm LA W OF HoMicmE 77-82 (1952). And
see, Dickey, op. cit. supra, note 81, at 387.
'Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 482 (1948).
' 2 BUDICK, LAW OF Cum sec. 461 (1946); Note, 36 KY. L. J. 320 (1948);
Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 443 (1948).
Compare Mr. Mann's categorization, Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 443, 452-453 (1948).
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killing, compromises by holding him guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter only.80 In Tabor v. Commonwealth,8 7 a Kentucky case,
the accused and two brothers had a difficulty the day preceding the
homicide but separated without bloodshed, one of the brothers
saying, "There will be another day." The following day was Sun-
day and the defendant approached one of the brothers as he stood
among a crowd of men and made certain remarks which were de-
signed to further the previous day's altercation. The brother im-
mediately made a reply whereupon the accused fired at him.
Thereupon, the second brother threw a rock at the accused in
aid of his brother upon which the defendant turned and shot,
killing him. At the trial the defendant's plea was self-defense but
he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter because by his own
actions he had induced the necessity for the homicide, and thus
could not avail himself of "perfect" self-defense.
8
Somewhat similar to the "imperfect" self-defense cases are
those in which the slayer erroneously and unreasonably believes
himself in danger of attack by the deceased. Some of these de-
cisions expressly state that heat of passion is not always necessary
to make out the crime of voluntary manslaughter. 9 Thus, the
judge stated in one of these cases:
"It is not always necessary to show that the killing was
done in heat of passion to reduce the crime to manslaugh-
ter, for where the killing is done because the slayer believes
that he is in great danger, but the facts do not warrant such
belief, it may be murder or manslaughter according to the
circumstances, even though there be no passion."90
Gadd v. Commonwealth,9 a Kentucky decision, seems to be
one of these cases where the defendant erroneously believed that
he was in danger of attack and was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter rather than murder.
(2) Reduction to voluntary manslaughter because of the
"partial insanity" of the accused.
The law is that a mental defect is not a defense to a criminal
'6 Note, 86 Ky. L. J. 443, 446 (1948).
' 26 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 82 S.W. 443 (1904).
' Note, 37 Ky. L. J. 334, 335 (1949). Accord, Main v. Corn., 13 Ky. L. Rep.
346, 17 S.W. 206 (1891).
"Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 443, 447 (1948), citing cases.
'° Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 409, 413 (1904).
305 Ky. 318, 204 S.W. 2d 215 (1947).
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action unless it is sufficient to constitute what amounts to legal in-
sanity in the particular jurisdiction.92 In determining what is
legal insanity, most courts adhere to the so-called "right and wrong
test." A substantial number of jurisdictions, however, add "ir-
resistible impulse" to the test for criminal insanity; if the accused
was irresistibly impelled to commit the criminal act, he is not re-
sponsible.93 Kentucky is one of the jurisdictions which add ir-
resistible impulse to the "right and wrong" test in determining
whether the accused is capable of having the intent requisite for
a criminal act.9
4
There is a certain trend toward allowing mental defects which
are something less than legal insanity in the particular jurisdiction
to serve as a mitigation of the offense. One illustration of this
trend is shown in a number of cases which have allowed mental
disorder less than legal insanity to reduce homicide from what
would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. A leading
case of such ."partial insanity" used to "reduce" murder to volun-
tary manslaughter is Fisher v. People, where the court said:
"Though such a state of mind would not excuse the homicide, it
should reduce it to manslaughter, for deliberation would be ab-
sent, and that is essential to constitute murder."95
Two cases have been found in which the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has subscribed to the mitigating influence of the develop-
ing rule that the "partial insanity" of the accused may reduce what
would otherwise be intentional murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter. In the first of these, Mangrum v. Commonwealth, the court
affirmed a conviction of voluntary manslaughter based upon an
instruction that the jury should acquit the defendant if they
should believe him insane or ".... if they should believe from the
evidence that he was of weak or feeble mind, they should con-
sider that fact in determining the degree of his guilt and the
measure of his punishment." 96 Again, in Rogers v. Common-
wealth,97 the Kentucky appellate court reversed a conviction of
' Maulding v. Com., 172 Ky. 370, 189 S.W. 251 (1916).
" State v. Felter, 25 Ia. 67 (1868). "
"Note, 32 Ky. L. J. 86 (1943). Weihofen lists Kentucky as one of the
seventeen states adding irresistible impulse to the test for criminal insanity.
WEIHoFEN, INsANrrY AS A DEFENSE IN CRnnNAL LAW 16 (1933).
23 IMI. 218, 232 (1859).
10 Ky. L. Rep. 94, 95, 39 S.W. 703, 704 (1897).
96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W. 813 (1894).
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murder holding that the accused was entitled to an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter, the court saying that the mental condi-
tion of the defendant, "whether feeble-minded or otherwise," was
a factor to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining
whether the malice requisite for murder existed at the time of the
homicide.
It is believed that such decisions represent an advance in the
law. As in the analogous case of provocation, they constitute a
compromise. For several hundred years a defendant who was
charged with intentional murder and who pleaded defective
mentality was either found guilty or exonerated completely. The
compromise effected by the "partial insanity" rule affords an
excellent way of handling a difficult problem. The defendant,
whose mental abnormality is substantial, although short of legal
insanity, may now in some jurisdictions, including Kentucky, have
his offense reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter. 9
An additional category of the crime of voluntary manslaughter
is comprised of those cases in which the accused intentionally kills
one to prevent a crime not involving violence. Thus, a Ken-
tucky case held the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter
where he intentionally killed an individual who was stealing his
whiskey. 99
Kentucky has no statute defining statutory voluntary man-
slaughter. The voluntary manslaughter statute in this state does
not define the crime, it simply provides a punishment for the
offense. 10 If a statute defining the offense were offered,101 it might
be worded substantially as follows:
"Sec.... Voluntary Manslaughter. An intended homi-
cide, which would be murder under sec ......... , (intended,
but unpremeditated murder), but which is committed in
sudden heat of passion immediately caused by a provoca-
tion sufficient to deprive a reasonable man of his self-con-
trol and power of cool reflection, is voluntary manslaugh-
ter."0 2
See Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 443, 448-450 (1948); Note, 37 Ky. L. J. 412 (1949).
See also Smith v. Com., 62 Ky. 224, 227 (1864) (moral insanity).
' Howard v. Com., 198 Ky 453 248 S.W. 1059 (1923).
"Ky. R. S. see. 435.020 (i948).
201 For a study of the statutes relating to voluntary manslaughter in the vari-
ous states, see MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOaNCahE 228 (1952).
" This statute is founded largely on the Louisiana statute and upon the in-
terpretation of the common law by Wechsler and Michael. See, LA. CODE CIUMr.
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In common with most of the statutes in other states, which
have attempted to define the crime in terms of heat of passion
and provocation, the proposed statute does not attempt a detailed
enumeration of the acts which shall be considered to be adequate
provocation. It has also been deemed unwise to incorporate in
the statute extenuating circumstances other than provocation,
such as "imperfect defense of self or habitation" and "partial in-
sanity," which may serve as mitigating agents. Existing statutes
in other jurisdictions do not do this. The law as to these has not
crystallized and the way should be left open, it is believed, to use
and develop them as a part of the common law, at least for the
present.
Before leaving the subject of voluntary manslaughter, specific
mention and criticism should be made of that anomalous Ken-
tucky crime called the negligent voluntary manslaughter. This hy-
brid crime, the fruit of an unnatural union between intent and
negligence, 03 has caused a great deal of confusion in the law in
this jurisdiction. No matter how far intent and negligence are ex-
tended they never become synonymous. The negligent voluntary
manslaughter is a technical impossibility.
The crime was occasioned by the fact that a line of cases, dis-
cussed at page 147, supra, refused to recognize the common law
negligent murder.0 4 It is hard to determine just why this occur-
red. Certainly practically all other jurisdictions do recognize the
negligent murder-either common law or statutory variety-and
another line of cases in Kentucky recognized ito1 so it survived in
this jurisdiction under these decisions until the recent statute'0 6
limiting punishment for all common law crimes to a maximum
imprisonment of one year, which eliminates it for all practical
purposes, since the punishment for involuntary manslaughter, a
lesser offense, is greater than provided for by this statute. At the
time of the passage of this statute,-and that was partly the reason
for its adoption-there was authority for three different negligent
LAw & PRo. art. 740-31 (1943) and comments thereto in the code and Wechsler
and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL. L. REv. 701, 718
(1937).
See Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 351, 352 (1951).
1°'See, for example, Ewing v. Com., 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W. 852 (1908); Lucas
v. Com., 231 Ky. 76, 21 S.W. 2d 113 (1929).
'See for example, Brown v. Corn., 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (1891)
and other cases and authorities cited in fn. 38, supra.
' Ky. R. S. sec. 431.075 (1950).
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homicides in this state,-common law negligent murder,107 negli-
gent voluntary manslaughter, 108 and involuntary manslaughter 0 9
caused by negligence. This was an impossible situation,-no
wonder the opinions of the Court of Appeals were in confusion
as an attempt was made to describe the different degrees of negli-
gence required for these three, separate crimes.
The recent decision in Marye v. Commonwealth,"0 which is
discussed fully in this article, infra, has done much to clean up the
confusion and to pave the way for a final solution to the problem.
This decision repudiates the long-standing rule that ordinary
negligence will support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
The way is now open for a rational solution to the whole problem
in this state. Experience in other jurisdictions would indicate
that this solution lies in the repudiation of the negligent volun-
tary manslaughter and a statutory recognition of the negligent
murder, as recommended, supra."' If the ordinary punishment
for the negligent murder, which is twenty one years to life in
most jurisdictions, is considered to be too severe, a lesser punish-
ment can be provided by the statute.
111. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Involuntary manslaughter at common law embraced two
closely related, not always distinguishable, concepts. The first was
that of an unintentional killing resulting from the doing of a law-
ful act, but without due caution and circumspection. The second
and closely allied common law conception was that of an unin-
tended homicide resulting from the doing of an unlawful act
which was not a felony." 2 Both principles are now generally in-
terpreted as requiring an act dangerous to life or limb, so there
is an over-lap in their application, but they had an independent
development until about seventy five years ago. Cases falling
within the ambit of the first of these concepts are classified as
negligent manslaughter; those falling within the ambit of the
'm See cases cited in fn. 104, supra.
See cases and authorities cited in fn. 105, supra.
See, for example, Jones v. Com., 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926) and
Note, 31 Ky. L. J. 284 (1943).
", 240 S.W. 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
. See the discussion, supra, p. 149.
'1 EAST, PLEAS OF TnE CROwN 255-271 (1803); FoSTER, CRowN LAW (2d.
ed.) 258-265 (1791).
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second fall into what is commonly called the misdemeanor-man-
slaughter category of involuntary manslaughter.
(a) Negligent Manslaughter
The negligent manslaughter, as the name implies, is a man-
slaughter arising out of criminal negligence. There are two im-
portant problems as to the crime. The first has to do with the
kind of standard which is to be employed in determining crimi-
nal negligence on the manslaughter level. The modern cases are
uniform as to this point,-the standard adopted is that of the "con-
duct of a reasonable man under like circumstances." This is called
the objective standard of care.1 13 The defendant cannot hide be-
hind his personal (subjective) belief that his conduct was non-
dangerous. He must measure up to the standard of what the com-
munity considers to be non-dangerous conduct.
The second problem of importance in criminal negligence, as
found in involuntary manslaughter, has to do with the degree of
negligence required for conviction and how to describe it. Prac-
tically all jurisdictions demand more than ordinary negligence;
generally it is stated that the required degree of negligence is
reached when the conduct of the accused creates "such an un-
reasonable risk of danger as to be recklessly disregardful of human
life and safety." This description makes the required degree of
negligence synonymous with "recklessness."1 14 Sometimes the
courts in describing the requisite degree of negligence use such
ambiguous words and phrases as "gross negligence," "culpable
negligence," "criminal negligence," "wicked negligence," "clear
negligence," and "complete negligence." None of these is as clear
and accurate as to describe it as "recklessness," it is believed.
Involuntary manslaughter is a common law offense, punishable
under section 481.075 of the Kentucky Statutes by imprisonment
in the county jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or by
a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both. 115
The decisions having to do with involuntary manslaughter oc-
casioned by negligence were in confusion in this state prior to the
" See the discussion, MonRELANi, Tin LAw OF HOMICIDE 127-132 (1952).
Id. at 138-141.
"
5 See Ky. R. S. sec. 431.075 (1950 Supp.). See Marye v. Com., 240 S.W. 2d
852, 853 (Ky. 1951).
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recent case of Marye v. Commonwealth.116 There were some de-
cisions which seemed to indicate that more than ordinary negli-
gence was required for conviction of involuntary manslaughter
but other cases seemed to hold that ordinary negligence was suf-
ficient. At any rate the matter was definitely cleared up in the
Marye case, which will now be discussed in considerable detail.
Ted Marye, a student in the College of Law at the University
of Kentucky, unintentionally killed Mr. and Mrs. LeRoy Land,
while driving his father's automobile in a residential section of
Lexington, Ky., at 9:00 p.m. on the night of June 25, 1950. Mr.
and Mrs. Land were standing on the lawn in front of their home,
having just alighted from a friend's automobile. There was evi-
dence that young Marye was driving at an excessive rate of speed
and that he had drunk at least three bourbon highballs about
four hours earlier in the late afternoon. There was, however, also
evidence that the car from which the Land's had just alighted was
standing on the wrong side of the street, that it pulled out in front
of Marye's car, and that Marye was not driving at an excessive rate
of speed. The lower court instructed the jury that Marye would
be guilty if he "carelessly and negligently" ran the automobile
against the Lands causing their death. The jury found Marye
guilty and fixed his punishment at three months in jail and a fine
of $2500 on each indictment.
The appellate court reversed the convictions stating that more
than ordinary negligence is required to support a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter caused by criminal negligence.1 7
The landmark decision in the Marye case marks a decided
step in clearing up the confusion as to criminal negligence in this
jurisdiction. However, several important matters remain to be
determined and clarified. Chief among these is the choice of an
adequate definition for "that higher degree of negligence" which
the court decides is necessary for the imposition of criminal
liability on the involuntary manslaughter level. Unfortunately,
the court chose "gross negligence" as the key phrase in that defini-
" Marye v. Com., 240 S.W. 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
"7 Very interestingly, the reversals were based partly upon the failure of the
court to instruct on "sudden emergency," occasioned by the alleged sudden pulling
out of a car in front of Marye's automobile, causing him to swerve upon the side-
walk. As to this point the court stated that there is ample authority in civil cases
and "there is no valid reason why the same rule should not apply in a criminal
case." Id. at 856.
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tion. Gross negligence is a vague and ambiguous term. Worse
still, the court used one of the poorest possible definitions to
describe what gross negligence is (although the definition is one
which appears often in decisions). Said the court, "Gross negli-
gence is the failure to exercise slight care." As a commentator,
who criticised the opinion in an editorial in the Lexington Leader
pointed out, slight care is practically no care at all. "Presumably,
should the driver have one hand on the steering wheel and one
foot within reaching distance of the brake pedal, he would be
exercising 'slight care.'"118 A subsequent editorial concluded:
"Since it would be virtually impossible for anyone to drive a motor
vehicle a half-block without exercising slight care, the Legislature
certainly owes it to the people of Kentucky to put some teeth in
the law. Otherwise traffic deaths will be legal killing."119
The decision in the Marye case points up what the courts on
the civil side discovered some time ago,-gross negligence is a
poor phrase to use to describe lack of care. On the civil side the
courts, which formerly used this phrase and certain other equally
vague terms to describe the care required under varying circum-
stances now instruct simply: Did the defendant fail to exercise the
care that a reasonable man should have exercised under the cir-
cumstances?"
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The problem, however, is much more difficult on the criminal
side. The negligence required for manslaughter is greater than
that which is required for tort liability. And the negligence re-
quired for murder is still greater than that required for man-
slaughter. A search must be made for terms, as accurate as possi-
ble, to describe each of these higher degrees of negligence on the
criminal side.
As a result of this search, the courts more and more are turning
to '"recklessness" as the term best suited to describe the higher
degree of negligence required for involuntary manslaughter and
certain other crimes based upon negligence below the negligent
murder level. "Recklessness" is a word which, while not the most
precise in connotation, nevertheless is not nearly so ambiguous as
"gross negligence" and certain other terms frequently found in
the cases. It raises a concept which is reasonably definite and uni-
"n Editorial, Lexington Leader, October 26, 1951, 4.
' Lexington Leader, November 13, 1951, 4.
' PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS see. 36 (1941); and see id. see. 38.
HoIflcaiE STATUTE
form in the minds of most people. Furthermore, it is believed
that the prevailing concept of reckless conduct is the one which
most nearly coincides with the feelings of the ordinary judge and
jury as to the degree of negligence which merits punishment as a
crime in the case of a homicide arising out of lack of reasonable
care.12'
Of course, the court in the Marye case was denied the use of
the word "reckless" to describe the conduct requisite for involun-
tary manslaughter because that word has already been pre-empted
in this jurisdiction by that technically impossible crime, the negli-
gent, voluntary manslaughter. The court discussed this un-
fortunate crime in the opinion and described it by way of dictum.
This dictum reiterated the rule established in a majority line of
Kentucky cases that "reckless, wanton conduct" resulting in homi-
cide is negligent, voluntary manslaughter.
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In combining "reckless" and "wanton" in its definition of
negligent, voluntary manslaughter the Kentucky court has piled
error upon error. "Reckless" and "wanton" are not synonyms.
The courts recognize this in most other jurisdictions and use
"reckless" in defining the negligence requisite for involuntary
manslaughter, while using "wanton" to describe the negligent
conduct required for the negligent murder.123 This, it is submit-
ted, is the proper use of the two words,-in no event should they
be used as synonyms.
It would appear that the easiest and quickest way to straighten
out the situation in Kentucky is by legislative action. If the negli-
gent voluntary manslaughter were repudiated, as suggested,
supra,'124 the way would be open for a statute placing the negli-
gent manslaughter under the classification of involuntary man-
slaughter where it ought to be with a punishment appropriate to
the felony that it is in other jurisdictions and with a description
of the negligence requisite for the offense framed in language in
accord with the existing law in the majority of other jurisdic-
tions. 125 Such a statute might be worded substantially as follows:
' MoRELAND, TnE LAw or HOMICmE 133-141 (1952).
'For a recent example, see Newcomb v. Corn., 276 Ky. 362, 124 S.W. 2d
486 (1939).
See Note, 40 Ky. L. I. 233, 234-236 (1952).
'
2 See the discussion, supra, page 148 et seq.
See the excellent Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 351 (1951).
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"The unintentional killing of a human being, . . .is in-
voluntary manslaughter, when committed: ...
"By conduct so dangerous and disregardful of the lives
and safety of others as to be recklessly disregardful of such
interests according to the standard of the conduct of a
reasonable man under the circumstances."
(b) Misdemeanor-manslaughter
Where one while in the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony unintentionally kills another, it is involun-
tary manslaughter at common law.1 26 The rule finds ample sup-
port in the Kentucky cases, where the crime, however, is punished
as a common law misdemeanor.
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Originally, as in the case of the felony murder, the rule
operated automatically. If it was shown that the accused was en-
gaged in the commission of a misdemeanor,-or even of a mere
civil wrong, at the time of the homicide he was guilty of man-
slaughter.128 As early as Hale and Foster, however, the rule was
qualified by the limitation that the unlawful act out of which the
killing arose must be malum in se and not merely malum prohi-
bitum.129 Hale and Foster interpreted the phrase, malum in se, to
mean "dangerous in itself," but it was later interpreted to mean
"morally or socially evil in itself." Under such an interpretation,
it would be manslaughter if D attempted to commit suicide in the
middle of a hundred acre field and unintentionally killed a tramp
asleep in a clump of bushes nearby, since attempted suicide is an
offense morally reprehensible.
About seventy five years ago a tendency toward a return to
the early meaning of the phrase became apparent. This arose
first on the felony murder level of the unlawful act doctrine in
vitriolic attacks upon the rule by Judge Stephen, culminating in
his historic decision in Regina v. Serne 30 that a person accused of
murder would not be guilty under the felony murder rule unless
the felony out of which the homicide arose was "dangerous in it-
self." This fortunate return to the early interpretation of Hale
Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 346 (1951).
For an attempted rationalization as to why the crime is punished as a com-
mon law misdemeanor in Kentucky, see Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 351 (1951).
MORELAND, THE LAW OF HoMIcDE 186 (1952).
Idem.
16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
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and Foster has its parallel on the misdemeanor manslaughter
level in the leading case of Regina v. Franklin.131 Since these two
cases, the law in England has been that in all such cases the basic
test is the amount of danger in the act causing the death rather
than its lawfulness or unlawfulness.
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American courts are gradually, but surely, coming to the same
conclusion. Professor Robinson states the situation as follows:
(The) "... . phrase 'not amounting to a felony' is not of
much present day importance, because courts have ruled
that it is not the fact that the subordinate act, either mis-
demeanor or felony, is prohibited by statute, but that it is
the characteristics of the prohibited subordinate act that
make the unintended killing a crime. If the subordinate act
is dangerous to the lives and safety of others, then a killing,
though unintended, which occurs in the commission of the
subordinate act is a criminal homicide, provided, of course,
that the killing was the natural or necessary consequence of
the subordinate act."1'3
Stated in this way, the misdemeanor manslaughter is practi-
cally synonymous with the negligent manslaughter, and that is the
current opinion. The test in all such cases then becomes the usual
criterion for criminal negligence on the manslaughter level: Did
the conduct of the accused amount to reckless disregard for human
life and safety under the circumstances? 3 4
The language used in many of the Kentucky misdemeanor-
manslaughter cases would seem to indicate a blind following of
the historic rule that a homicide occurring in the course of an un-
lawful act less than felony is necessarily manslaughter. Thus, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals said in a recent opinion:
"... Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another
in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and
not likely to endanger human life and without intention to
kill, or the killing of another while doing a lawful act in an
unlawful or negligent manner, where the negligence is such
as to indicate a disregard for human life."' 35 (Italics
writer's).
15 Cox C. C. 163 (1883).
"MonELAND, THE LAW OF HoMIcm. 222 (1952).
'Robinson, Manslaughter by Motorists, 22 MnN. L. R. 755, 777 (1938).
His discussion pp. 774 et seq. will be found very helpful.
" MonEILAND, THE LAW OF Hoiacms 195 (1952).
'Middleton v. Com., 304 Ky. 784, 787, 202 S.W. 2d 610, 611 (1947).
Other cases containing similar language are cited in the Middleton case.
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Does the Kentucky court really intend to say that a killing
occurring in the commission of an unlawful act not likely to en-
danger human life is involuntary manslaughter?
Mr. Rice in a recent study of the Kentucky misdemeanor-man-
slaughter cases'316 comes to the conclusion that, while the lan-
guage used by the court would seem to go that far, the facts of the
cases where such language is used show in each instance sufficient
negligence to warrant a conviction on that ground. He concludes
that "whether Kentucky, or indeed most any court, will convict of
involuntary manslaughter on the sole ground that the homicidal
act was committed in the perpetration of an unlawful act where
there is no negligence is doubtful.' 1
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The writer has not checked all of the Kentucky cases which
use such language to see whether Mr. Rice's conclusion is correct
that the facts of each and every one of these cases show sufficient
negligence to warrant a conviction on that ground, but, be that as
it may, the oft-repeated rule of the court on this matter is most
unfortunate. The rule, as ennunciated, is out-moded and may
lead to a result of injustice in a particular case at any time. The
doctrine should be rephrased by the court to conform to the
present concensus of judicial opinion that a homicide occurring
in the course of a misdemeanor is not involuntary manslaughter
unless the misdemeanor is sufficiently dangerous in itself to cause
the defendant's act to be criminally negligent.
(c) Negligent homicide in operation of motor vehicle
The decision in the Marye case' 38 was the occasion for an act
passed by the 1952 session of the Kentucky legislature providing
punishment for the "negligent operation of a motor vehicle caus-
ing the death of another."'3 9 Public resentment to the decision
was touched off primarily by the Court's definition of gross negli-
gence as "lack of slight care." It was the common concensus of
opinion that under such a definition of criminal negligence it
would be practically impossible to secure convictions of involun-
tary manslaughter in automobile homicide cases. The 1952 statute
'Note 41 Ky. L. J. 94 (1952).
MId. at 96.
240 S.W. 2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
' 1952 Leg. Acts of Ky., c. 51, p. 61.
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was passed largely to provide another avenue for possible convic-
tions by creating another crime.
This approach to the problem of securing convictions for
homicides arising out of criminal negligence in the operation of
automobiles when it is impossible to secure enough convictions of
involuntary manslaughter is not a particularly new one in the
United States. Michigan adopted such an act, the first of a series
of similar legislation in American jurisdictions, in 1921. This
statute creating the separate offense of negligent homicide in the
operation of any vehicle, provided that anyone operating any
vehicle "at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless
or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly" and so causing
the death of another should be guilty of "the crime of negligent
homicide" and upon conviction should pay a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars or undergo imprisonment in the state prison
for a period not exceeding five years. The statute further pro-
vided that the offense should be deemed to be included within
every crime of manslaughter charged to have been committed in
the operation of any vehicle, so if the jury should find the de-
fendant not guilty of manslaughter, it might in its discretion
render a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide under the
statute.14
0
Fifteen or more states and the District of Columbia have since
passed somewhat similar statutes.1 41 The great majority of these
provide that the degree of negligence requisite for liability shall be
the equivalent of "recklessness." However, in a few instances ordi-
nary negligence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.1 42
The Kentucky statute does not indicate the degree of negli-
gence that is required. The statute simply provides for punish-
" Micn. Comp. LAWS sees. 16743-16745 (1929). See Mic. CoMP. LAws
sees. 750.324-750.326 (1948)."I See MoRELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 246 et seq. (1952) for a discussion
of these statutes in some detail.
..Ordinary negligence apparently is sufficient under the statutes in effect in
Vermont ("careless or negligent operation"); New Jersey ("careless operation"-
hut the offense is a misdemeanor); and Colorado (where the c~ourts have held that
civil negligence is sufficient). Idem. Civil negligence was sufficient under a Cali-
fornia statute but the statute was repealed in 1943. See CAL. VEHICLE CODE, sec.
500 (Deering, 1948). There is doubt as to the proper interpretation of the Con-
necticut statute which, like the new Kentucky Act, provides punishment for homi-
cide resulting from the "negligent operation of a motor vehicle." See CoNN. GEN.
STAT. see. 235 f (1941 Supp.). And, of course, the Michigan statute, discussed in
the text, provides for liabilit if the driver operates the vehicle in a "careless,
reckless, or negligent manner. See MicH. Comp. LAws sec. 750.324 (1948).
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ment for homicide resulting from the "negligent operation of a
motor vehicle."' 43 Consequently, the determination of the degree
of negligence requisite for liability will be a matter for determina-
tion by the courts. If one were to prophesy, he would be safer if
he were to predict that the Kentucky courts, following the
majority of jurisdictions, would interpret the statute as requiring
a degree of negligence greater than that needed for civil liability.
It may well be doubted, however, whether that was the legislative
intention. Since the statute was occasioned by the general dis-
satisfaction arising out of the application of the definition of
"gross negligence" in the Marye case, it is altogether possible that
the legislature intended to provide for liability under the new
statute where the negligence of the accused was something less
than gross negligence, i.e., ordinary negligence. In any event the
statute should be amended to make the legislative intent clear.
In attempting to suggest such an amendment it is rather hard
to make a decision as to whether more than ordinary negligence
should be required under the statute. Undoubtedly, legislatures
have shown a great reluctance to impose criminal liability for
negligence which is no greater than that required for civil liability.
That reluctance is plainly apparent in the type of statute under
consideration where the great majority of jurisdictions require
reckless conduct or its equivalent. It is also a matter of record that
California which had a statute of this character imposing criminal
liability for what might be interpreted as civil negligence has seen
fit to repeal the statute. 4 4
On the other hand it is arguable that something new must be
done if convictions are to be obtained in such cases, since juries
have shown a marked reluctance to convict of involuntary man-
slaughter under a standard higher than ordinary negligence. It is
also apparent that civil liability for damages does not seem to be
a sufficient deterrent in such cases for-as everyone knows-an in-
surance company usually stands in the background as a silent
partner of the accused to hold him "financially harmless."
... The language of the statute is as follows: "Any person who, by negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, causes the death of another, under circumstances not
otherwise punishable as a homicide, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or both." Senate Bill No.
145, regular session 1952. The offense it will be noted is a statutory misdemeanor.
' See CAL. VEHICLE CODE, see. 500 (Deering, 1948).
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Weighing these considerations, the writer, without feeling too
sure of his position, recommends that more than ordinary negli-
gence be required to sustain a conviction under the statute. Even
though the degree of negligence then required for conviction
would be the same as that demanded in the case of the negligent
involuntary manslaughter, it is believed that the statute would
have several new features which would result in more convictions
than would be possible under the recommended negligent in-
voluntary manslaughter statute145 alone.
Foremost among these is the fact that the new offense is a mis-
demeanor; the negligent involuntary manslaughter should be a
felony,140 as it is in most jurisdictions. Juries will convict of a mis-
demeanor when they would be unwilling to make a felon out of
the defendant. Again, the punishment for the new offense, while
substantial, is less than customarily inflicted for manslaughter.
For this reason the jury might well elect to convict of the new
offense where the punishment is a fine or a short imprisonment in
the county workhouse, or both, although they would be unwilling
to convict of involuntary manslaughter where the punishment is
customarily confinement in the penitentiary. Finally, it is be-
lieved that a jury might convict for a violation of the new statute
because it is labeled "Negligent homicide in the operation of a
vehicle," rather than "Manslaughter." Juries often feel that the
manslaughter label is too harsh for these automobile homicide
cases but they are willing to convict the defendant if the offense
has a less odious name.
Since the new statute was passed because of a general dissatis-
faction with the result in the Marye case, it will be of value to
examine that case in the light of these observations. Of course, in
analyzing the Marye case cognizance should first be taken of the
fact that the case was tried the second time under instructions
which embodied the definition of the negligence required for in-
voluntary manslaughter as "lack of slight care." If the requisite
degree of negligence had been described as synonymous with
"recklessness," the rule in other jurisdictions, it is altogether pos-
sible that a conviction could have been obtained. All of this is of
"' See the reconmmended statute, supra, page 166.
" It is, of course, only a common law misdemeanor at the present time. See
the discussion, supra, p. 139.
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course colored by the pernicious influence of that impossible
crime, the negligent voluntary manslaughter, which is recognized
in this state.
But, be that as it may, suppose the jury in the Marye case had
refused to convict of involuntary manslaughter, what are the pos-
sibilities that they might have agreed upon a conviction of the
crime of "Negligent homicide in the operation of a motor vehicle,"
assuming that the statute had then been in effect and interpreted
as requiring a higher degree of negligence than is demanded in
civil cases based upon negligence?
It is believed that there is a good possibility that the jury
would have agreed upon a conviction under the new statute under
those circumstances. 14 7 The circumstances probably were sufficient
to support a finding of "recklessness" by a jury. Although un-
willing to convict a young college student of a felony-assuming
that involuntary manslaughter had been one at the time-the jury
might well have been willing to convict him of a misdemeanor
with a punishment of a substantial fine or even with confinement
in the county jail. In considering the result in the Marye case two
factors should be kept in mind,- (1) the unsatisfactory definition
of gross negligence occasioned by the fact that the negligent volun-
tary manslaughter has pre-empted the use of "recklessness" in
describing the negligence requisite for involuntary manslaughter
in this state and (2) the fact that at the time of the case the statute
prohibiting the "negligent homicide in the operation of a vehicle"
was not in existence. Change either, or both, of these factors and
there might well have been a conviction in the case.
IV. SUGGESTED HOMICIDE ACT
It has been the plan of this paper to study the Kentucky cases
on homicide in the light of the law in other jurisdictions and from
such examination and such findings as might result to make those
recommendations which, in the opinion of the writer, might lead
to an improvement in the law in this jurisdiction. It is believed
that the discussions and suggestions which appear in the preceding
""' This observation does not take into consideration the "sudden emergency"
phase of the Marye case. No determination is attempted as to that phase of the
case.
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pages may best be summarized and consolidated in the form of a
homicide statute.
With these considerations in mind, the following statute is
offered:
Homicide Act
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Sec. 1. Homicide, General Provisions. Criminal homi-
cide is the unlawful killing of a human being by the act,
procurement or culpable omission of another. Criminal
homicide is murder, manslaughter, or the unlawful killing
of a human being by criminal negligence in the operation
of a motor vehicle.
Sec. 2. Murder in the first degree defined. The killing
of a human being, unless it is justifiable or excusable, is
murder in the first degree when committed:
With a deliberate and premeditated intent to effect the
death of the person killed, or of awther. The word "de-
liberate" as used in this section means formed, arrived at,
or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of consequences. The word "premeditated" means
thought on and resolved in the mind beforehand; contrived
and designed previously.
Murder in the first degree is punishable by death, unless
the jury recommends life imprisonment.
Sec. 3. Murder in the second degree defined. Such killing
of a human being is murder in the second degree, when
committed:
a. With an intent to effect the death of the person
killed, or of another, but without deliberation and premedi-
tation; or
b. Unintentionally, by an act so extremely dangerous
and disregardful of the lives and safety of others as to be
wantonly disregardful of such interests according to the
standard of the conduct of a reasonable man under the
circumstances.
Murder in the second degree is punishable by imprison-
ment, the minimum of which shall not be less than twenty-
one years, and the maximum of which shall be for the of-
fender's natural life, in the discretion of the jury.
Sec. 4. Voluntary manslaughter defined. An intended homi-
cide, which would be murder in the second degree under
"' For a more extended discussion of this statute and some other features see
MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOinfCmE 309 et seq. (1952), Tim BOBBS-MERRMILL Co.,
INDiANAPOLIS, INDiANA, price $7.50.
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Section 3-a of this act, but which is committed in sudden
heat of passion immediately caused by a provocation suf-
ficient to deprive a reasonable man of his self-control and
power of cool reflection is voluntary manslaughter.
Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding twenty-one
years.
Sec. 5. Involuntary manslaughter defined. An unintended
homicide committed by the criminal negligence of any per-
son and which does not constitute murder in the second de-
gree under section 3-b of this act shall be involuntary man-
slaughter. Criminal negligence as used in this section means
conduct creating such an unreasonable risk to human life
and safety as to be recklessly disregardful of such interests
according to the standard of the conduct of a reasonable
man under the circumstances.
Involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding fifteen
years or by a fine of not exceeding $10,000, or both.
Sec. 6. Negligent homicide in the operation of a motor
vehicle. Any person who, by the operation of a motor ve-
hicle in a reckless manner, but not wilfully or wantonly,
shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of the crime
of negligent homicide and upon conviction shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for
not more than one year, or both.
The crime of negligent homicide shall be deemed to be
included within every crime of involuntary manslaughter
charged to have been committed in the criminally negligent
operation of a motor vehicle; if the jury shall find the de-
fendant not guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter
such jury may in its discretion render a verdict of negligent
homicide.
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Now what are the salient features of the suggested Homicide
Act and what changes does it make in the existing Kentucky law?
Answers to these questions may be categorized as follows:
(1) Murder
"Willful" murder is the only statutory murder in Kentucky
at the present time. The common law negligent and felony mur-
" See the Michigan statute, discussed in MoinaLA, TnE LAw oF HoimcDE
246 (1952).
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ders have been driven underground in this state by Ky. R. S. sec.
431.075, which limits the punishment for all common law crimes,
the punishment for which is not provided by statute, to a maxi-
mum imprisonment of one year.
The suggested Act changes this situation in two ways:
(a) The Act divides "intended" murder into two degrees.
While all murder is heinous, it is not believed that it should all
be subject to the same punishment. However, in the past, the at-
tempts of the legislatures of the various states to describe the
cold-blooded, planned killing which is ordinarily punished as
murder in the first degree, has been defeated by the practice of
the courts of watering-down language until the intent of the legis-
lators has been defeated. The recommended statute has attempted
to evade this by resorting to the expedient of defining the key
words "deliberate" and "premeditated" in the statute itself. The
legislature having ascribed to these words the particular meaning
in which they are intended to be used, the courts will be unable
to extend or modify it.
The statute classifies the unplanned intentional killing as
murder in the second degree.
(b) The proposed statute resuscitates the negligent murder.
Most jurisdictions incorporate the negligent murder in their homi-
cide statutes; indeed in a number of states it is murder in the first
degree by statute. There would probably be few convictions
under such a statute but it would be available for an extreme
case, it would bring the situation in Kentucky in line with the
majority of other jurisdictions, and it would be a major step in
the correction of the unfortunate situation prevailing at the pres-
ent time because of the negligent, voluntary manslaughter, which
still remains a crime in this state.
A homicide occurring in the course of a felony is punishable
under the proposed negligent murder statute, if the felonious act
under the circumstances of the case constituted wantonly negli-
gent conduct.
(2) Intentional (voluntary) manslaughter
The projected statute frames the definition of voluntary man-
slaughter simply in terms of "provocation" and "heat of passion,"
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in effect a codification of the common law, and it does not, it is be-
lieved, change the existing law in the state.
The statute does not, however, incorporate the existing crime,
the negligent, voluntary manslaughter. It is the intention of the
proposed Act to weed this "impossible" crime out of Kentucky
law, distributing criminally negligent homicides into the statutory
categories of (a) negligent murder, (b) involuntary manslaughter,
and (c) negligent homicide in the operation of a motor vehicle.
A determination whether it is wise to extend the doctrine of
mitigation to include "imperfect defense of self or habitation"
and/or "partial insanity" has been left a matter for the courts.
The projected statute has omitted them. There are already in-
stances of both in the decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
(3) involuntary manslaughter
The proposed Act provides that the degree of negligence re-
quired for conviction of involuntary manslaughter is reached
when the conduct of the accused creates "such an unreasonable
risk of danger as to be recklessly disregardful of human life and
safety." This description makes the required degree of negli-
gence synonymous with "recklessness." The standard of conduct
adopted here, as in the negligent murder, is the objective one of
the "conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances."
Involuntary manslaughter, now a common law misdemeanor
in this state, becomes a felony under the Act, as it is in other juris-
dictions. The Act would have the effect of changing the existing
definition of the negligence required for involuntary manslaugh-
ter from "lack of slight care" to the equivalent of "recklessness."
The projected statute completely repudiates the "unlawful
act" doctrine on both the murder and manslaughter levels, thus
throwing all cases which formerly fell into these categories into
the negligent murder and negligent manslaughter divisions of the
law of homicide. The felony murder is already out of Kentucky
law for all practical purposes because of Ky. R. S. sec. 481.075
(1950). Kentucky has been rendering lip service to the mis-
demeanor-manslaughter doctrine but it is doubtful if the Act
changes the result reached in the existing Kentucky cases, since,
as the discussion in this paper points out, the facts of all of them
apparently involve criminally negligent conduct.
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(4) Negligent homicide in the operation of a motor vehicle.
The proposed Act incorporates the new offense, the negligent
homicide in the operation of a motor vehicle. Some changes are
effected in the existing statute passed by the 1952 session of the
legislature. The proposed statute clarifies the present situation
by providing definitely that more than ordinary negligence is re-
quired for a conviction of the offense,- negligence equivalent to
"recklessness" is demanded. While the new offense is a mis-
demeanor, the statute specifically provides that it shall be included
in every crime of involuntary manslaughter charged to have been
committed in the criminally negligent operation of a motor ve-
hicle, thus giving the jury the election, in its discretion, to convict
the accused of either offense. While the degree of negligence re-
quired for a conviction under the new offense is the same as is de-
manded for involuntary manslaughter,-the equivalent of reckless-
ness, it is believed that juries will often convict of it when they
would not convict of involuntary manslaughter since it is only a
misdemeanor, the name of the offense is less offensive, and the
punishment is less.
Conclusion. It is apparent that there are several bad spots in
the law of homicide in this state. In addition, the law needs clari-
fication in a number of places. An attempt might be made to
correct these defects piecemeal, either by decision or by legislation.
But piecemeal correction is slow and often very unsatisfactory in
result. It would be better to do a complete job at one time.
Take, for example, the problem of criminal negligence. Pro-
ceeding piecemeal, it will take fifty years to correct the existing
situation because negligence appears on several levels in the law
of homicide. The decision in Marye v. Commonwealth was a step
in the right direction but it was patchwork correction and several
major problems remain unsolved. A realistic approach to the
situation would seem to suggest a complete and quick solution of
the entire problem.
It is with such considerations in mind that the proposed Homi-
cide Act is submitted. It is believed that it is in line with modern
thought on the subject, as reflected in the statutory regulation of
homicide in other states, and it is hoped that it will receive careful
consideration as a possible working guide for legislative action.
